This study aims to examine the effects of financial distress on top management structures, as well as to identify the factors affecting managerial change in the companies that adopted the reorganization plan during bankruptcy proceedings in the Republic of Serbia for the period 2009-2014. Out of 39 companies that adopted the reorganization plan, the top management change was observed in 21 companies after the bankruptcy filing year, or within two years following the reorganization plan adoption. Research results indicate a strong negative correlation between the company's liquidity and the probability of change in top management structures, with the impact of other observed factors not being statistically significant.
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the empirical evidence has demonstrated that fi nancial distress is accompanied by signifi cant changes in top management structures. Th erefore, multiple research perspectives have been developed with the aim to investigate such infl uence. Based on a sample of 69 companies that fi led for Chapter 11 proceedings during 1979 -1984 , Gilson (1989 documented that 55% of them replaced their CEOs within the two years preceding the bankruptcy fi ling year, and 71% in the period of two years following the bankruptcy fi ling year. Based on a sample of 43 large companies which fi led for Chapter 11 during 1979 -1988 , LoPucki and Whitford (1993 documented that 91% of them replaced their CEOs in the period starting eighteen months before the bankruptcy fi ling year and ending six months aft er the adoption of the reorganization plan. On a sample of 197 companies that fi led for Chapter 11 proceedings during 1979 -1988 , Hotchkiss (1995 found that 70% of the observed companies replaced their CEOs upon the fi ling year. Having analyzed the sample of 75 companies that fi led for Chapter 11 proceedings during 1982 -1990 , Betker (1995 documented that 51% of CEOs were replaced before the fi ling year, 75% just before the reorganization plan was adopted, and 91% following the adoption of the reorganization plan. On a sample of 267 German companies that faced fi nancial distress during 1996 -2004 , Jostarndt and Sautner (2006 recorded that only 14% of chief executives and 22% of chief directors remained within the company four years aft er the company entered fi nancial distress. Involuntary management turnovers in their sample exceeded 80%. Relying on a sample of 153 large privately and publicly held companies that fi led for Chapter 11 during 2001, Ayotte and Morrison (2009) documented that 41% of CEOs were replaced within one year following the bankruptcy fi ling year and 70% within two years from the bankruptcy fi ling year. On a sample of 184 reorganized companies that fi led for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2006 , Surendranath and Madura (2010 documented that CEOs were replaced in 69% of all bankruptcy cases. On a sample of 626 companies that were reorganized in Chapter 11, Bharath et al. (2013) documented increase in management turnover rates between 1980 and the early 2000s by 65%, and this increase was attributed to the creditors who took control over the company in fi nancial distress. On a sample of 342 public companies that fi led for Chapter 11 during 1996-2007, Eckbo et al. (2012) found that incumbent CEOs in the companies in fi nancial distress are more likely to be forced to leave. More than half of the incumbent CEOs regain full-time employment while the other half experience an income loss with median percent value of $4 million (discounted until retirement age).
Th ere is an abundance of empirical evidence regarding the factors aff ecting management turnover. Crain et al. (1977 Crain et al. ( , pp. 1374 documented that turnover was very responsive to the profi t performance of the company, and that non-profi t maximization behaviour in the private sector is not typically tolerated in the market for executive services. Wagner et al. (1984) reported negative correlation between the company's performance and top management turnover. Th is is supported by Healy (2011) who also determined signifi cant negative relation between the company's performance and the probability of a CEOs turnover. According to Fizel and Louie (1990) , CEOs turnover is infl uenced more by internal governance structure than by profi t or sale performance. Jostarndt and Sautner (2006) found that managerial replacement is more aff ected by shift s in ownership and control, rather than absolute levels of ownership concentration or the size of the equity holdings by private investors. In the companies in fi nancial distress, management turnover was led by banks and fi nancial investors who took control over the company in fi nancial distress. Kesner and Dalton (2007) and Ting (2011) found that poor company's performance prior to CEOs succession leads to greater turnover aft erwards. Th e same result was confi rmed by Kaplan and Minton (2012) . So far it has been possible to explain empirical evidence in two ways. Firstly, having in mind that poor fi nancial performance is predominately the result of previous management decisions, turnover of the top management could be forced by owners, even if the poor performance is not the result of decisions made by incumbent management, Fisman et al. (2013) . Secondly, the turnover could be forced by creditors and investors who take control over the company in fi nancial distress (Jostarndt & Sautner, 2006; Eckbo et al., 2012; Bharath et al., 2013) .
Th e main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of fi nancial distress on the top management and identify the factors that infl uence the change in managerial structures in the companies that have been reorganized in bankruptcy. Most research in this area focuses on the developed countries while this is the fi rst time that someone examines the impact of fi nancial distress on top management structures within the companies that have been reorganized during bankruptcy in the Republic of Serbia. Th is infl uence was investigated on a sample of 39 large and mediumsized non-fi nancial companies in fi nancial distress that were reorganized in bankruptcy in the Republic of Serbia during [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . In order to exclude the impact of fi nancial distress on the ownership structures, this study takes into account only the change in the top management that was not involved in the company's ownership.
Having in mind that the quality of the top management could aff ect the survival of companies following the adoption of the reorganization plan, Bogan and Sandler (2012) claimed that this study could be used for future improvement of the existing reorganization knowledge and practice in the Republic of Serbia. Banks are particularly interested in such improvement, as they are the main creditors of the real estate sector in the Republic of Serbia.
Th e paper is organized as follows. Aft er the literature overview, the paper presents the methodology used. Th e Methodology section provides some basic information on the companies included in the sample, depicts the data used, summarizes descriptive statistics, outlines the used research methodology, employed variables, and the model used to examine the impact of the variables on the change in top management structures. Th e following section depicts the results, whereas the fi nal section contains the main fi ndings.
METHODOLOGY Sample Selection Process
Given the aim of this study, the sample includes medium-and large-sized non-fi nancial companies that completed the bankruptcy proceedings through adoption of the reorganization plan during [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] in the Republic of Serbia. Bearing in mind that fi nancial crises and failures of large and medium-sized Serbian companies started in 2009, and continued during 2010-2014, this research period could be considered representative.
For the purpose of this research, a company is considered to be in private ownership if the state has less than 50% of ownership share in bankruptcy fi ling year. Based on the statistics of the Bankruptcy Supervision Agency, 42 large and medium-sized private Serbian non-fi nancial companies adopted the reorganization plan during 2009-2014. For the purpose of this research, the plan is adopted if the court reaches the decision to adopt the reorganization plan, and such decision is fi nal. Th e research included only non-fi nancial companies in fi nancial distress. A company is classifi ed as fi nancially distressed if its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are less than the reported interest expense, over a period of any two consecutive years, or if the EBITDA is less than 80% of its interest expense in any year, (Asquith et al., 1994) . In this respect, out of the population of 42 companies, 3 companies were excluded from the fi nal sample due to the fact that they were not in fi nancial distress. Th e main features of the initial population versus excluded companies, and the fi nal sample are presented in Table 1 .
Balance sheets and income statement data used in the research originate from the Serbian Business Registers Agency, while the information related to ownership, industry classifi cation and management structure was obtained from Boniteti.rs, Poslovna.rs (electronic database) and the Serbian Business Registers Agency. Th e texts of the reorganization plans, and other relevant data concerning the bankruptcy proceedings were obtained from the Serbian Business Registers Agency, the Portal of Serbian Courts and/or the offi cial site of the companies. In order to isolate the impact of decisions made during the bankruptcy period, fi nancial ratios used in this research were calculated based on the fi nancial fi gures that stem from the end of the fi scal year prior to bankruptcy.
Sample Statistics
Th e majority of the companies in the fi nal sample belong to the manufacturing industry (48.7%), with a signifi cant number belonging to wholesale trade (28.2%) and construction industry (12.8%). A large fraction of the sample companies experienced a strong decline in profi tability, 32 companies experienced net loss in the year preceding the bankruptcy fi ling year and 38 companies experienced net loss in the fi ling year. One of the largest problems in the Republic of Serbia is that the fi lings for the reorganization are late, due to long, expensive and unsuccessful private negotiations with creditors preceding the reorganization. For the same reason, most of the reorganizations are ineffi cient and the reorganized companies fi le for bankruptcy within 2 years aft er the adoption of the reorganization plan. In the fi nal sample, 14 of the reorganized companies fi led for bankruptcy until February 15, 2015, while the change in top management structures was observed in 8 companies.
As regards the impact of fi nancial distress on corporate governance, the change in top management structures was observed in 21 companies in the fi nal sample aft er the bankruptcy fi ling year or two years following the adoption of the reorganization plan. Also, 8 companies changed their ownership structures, while in 18 companies the reorganization plan envisaged the establishment of the Board of Creditors or some other similar body with the aim to control the company's business or monitor the realization of the reorganization plan, as shown in Table 2 .
In order to determine the factors that increase the probability of change in the top management structures, research considers explanatory variables demonstrated by previous research to be relevant for top management turnover. In order to analyze the impact of the variables, a model was developed in the research.
Model Inputs
Th e model developed in this research utilizes one binary dependent variable, a variable with two possible outcomes, and six explanatory variables. All analyses were performed using the SPSS soft ware.
Dependent Variable
Th is research uses the dependent variable TURN-OVER, with two outcomes: attributing 1 in the event that the top management structures changed aft er the bankruptcy fi ling year, or two years following the adoption of the reorganization plan; and 0 if no change was made in the top management structures during the observed period. Management turnover is defi ned as a change in the position of the company's top executives (director, president of supervisory board and/or members of the supervisory board), which were not involved in the company's ownership during the observed period. Th e change of the top executives was observed aft er the bankruptcy fi ling year and two years following the adoption of the reorganization plan. Th e timeframe for the top management turnover has to balance the two opposing considerations. On one hand, reorganization is viewed as a time-consuming process whose eff ects may be felt substantially prior to or following the adoption of the reorganization plan. On the other hand, the change of the top management is not an unusual event in some of the companies and may not be related to fi nancial distress. For the same reason, the choice of a timeframe, which is a quite time-consuming process, could lead to potentially misleading conclusions.
Explanatory Variables
Th e following explanatory variables were used in the research: the company's size, fi nancial health, change in the ownership structures and the presence of the Board of Creditors. Th e last two variables refl ect the change in corporate governance mainly initiated by the creditors.
◆ Size. Change in corporate control is less likely to occur in large companies (Mulherin & Boone, 2000; Köke, 2001; Heiss & Köke, 2004) . Th is can be explained by the fact that monitoring and agency costs could be greater in larger companies. Th us, larger companies employ more skilled managers who are more likely to be retained in the company upon adopting the reorganization plan. Th e natural log of the company's total assets LN (AT) is used to measure the company's size. ◆ Financial health. Strong negative correlation between the probability of CEOs turnover and the company's performance is consistent with the previous research results. In order to examine the impact of the company's performance on the probability of change in the top management structures, current ratio (LIQUID-ITY) and debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE) were employed in the research as measures of the company's indebtedness. Th e current ratio (LIQUIDITY) was calculated as a ratio between current assets and current liabilities. Th e debt to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE) was calculated as a ratio between the total debt and the total value of assets, with the total debt including a book value of the company's short and long-term debt. As regards this, total debt takes the total company's liabilities and not only fi nancial liabilities. EBITDA margin (EBITDAMARGIN) was used as a measure of the company's profi tability. Th e EBITDA margin was calculated as a ratio of EBITDA to sales revenue, whereby EBITDA is defi ned as the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. ◆ Ownership change. According to Graham and Smart, (2011, p. 20) , managers act as agents of the owners who hired them and provided them with the decision-making authority. Th e empirical evidence also indicates that change in the existing ownership structures might infl uence the incumbent top management positions. Accordingly, an assumption was made in the research that in case the ownership structure changed aft er bankruptcy fi ling year or aft er the adoption of the reorganization plan, new owners would most likely place new managers (intuitive conclusion). In this respect, the model used the dependent variable OWNCHANGE with two outcomes: attributing 1 in the event that the ownership structure has undergone changes aft er the bankruptcy fi ling year, or following the adoption of the reorganization plan; and 0 if no change has been made to the ownership structure. ◆ Board of Creditors. Th e turnover in top management could be forced by creditors and investors who take control over the company in fi nancial distress (Jostarndt & Sautner, 2006; Bharath et al., 2013) . One of the strategies for taking control over a company in fi nancial distress is through the Board of Creditors or some other similar body established to monitor the company's business aft er the adoption of the reorganization plan. In this respect, the model employed the dependent variable CREDI-TORS COMMITTEE, taking the value of 1 if the Board of Creditors or some similar body was established in the company following the adoption of the reorganization plan, and 0 if such a body was not established.
Model
Th e following regression analysis was used in this research to explain the impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable: TURNOVER = β1× LN (AT) + β2× LIQUIDITY + β3× LEVERAGE + β4× EBITDAMARGIN + β5× OWN-CHANGE + β6× CREDITORS COMMITEE + ε where ε represents random error.
Binary Logistic Regression (BLR), as one of the most widely used statistical techniques, was used in this research. In the fi rst research phase, all explanatory variables were included in the model by applying the "Enter" method. In order to verify the results obtained in this phase, "Forward" method was implemented in the second phase, where explanatory variable LIQUIDITY was fi rst included in the model, considering that this variable had the most statistically signifi cant infl uence on the dependent variable compared to other explanatory variables, based on the BLR estimates obtained in the fi rst research phase. Table 3 shows the BLR estimates for the model in which the "Enter" method was applied, while Table  4 presents BLR estimates for the model in which the "Forward" method was applied. Th e results of the BLR estimates in both cases show that the explanatory variable LIQUIDITY has a statistically signifi cant infl uence on the dependent variable TURNOVER with a signifi cance level of 0.05. Th e sign of coefficient indicates a strong negative correlation between the explanatory variable LIQUIDITY and dependent variable TURNOVER. Also, the infl uence of other empirical variables used in the model was not statistically signifi cant -a result confi rmed in the fi rst and second phase of the research. Th e signs of the regression coeffi cients for variables LN (AT), and CREDITORS COMMITTEE are not consistent with the assumptions made in the Model inputs section, while the signs of the regression coeffi cients for explanatory variables LEVERAGE and EBITDAMAR-GIN are consistent with the assumptions. As regards the impact of the variable OWNCHANGE, the results of BLR estimates show that this variable does not have signifi cant infl uence on the dependent variable TURNOVER, while the sign of regression is negative. Th is is not supported by the empirical evidence and might be caused by a relatively small number of observations within the categories (i.e. small sample). Th e second explanation for such result could be found in the existing conditions in the top managers market. As in any other transition economy, the top managers market in the Republic of Serbia is small and undeveloped. Th e transition from a planned socialist economy to market-oriented economy was followed by dramatic changes in the company's core activities and business models. Th ere was insuffi cient number of experienced and educated managers that could keep pace with such changes. Th is led to development of the young generation of managers who were closely controlled by the largest equity holders of the company. As regards this, decisions made by the top management were infl uenced by the owners. Given that general and specifi c human capital is of vital importance for the success of the company, CEOs with a high level of human capital are less likely to be replaced (Crook et al., 2011; Hutchinson & Russell, 2013) . Consequently, if the new owners are not familiar with the business model of the reorganized company, they will probably be willing to keep the existing top managers with a high level of human capital and use other means of control to infl uence the choice of top management and provide them with incentives to improve the overall company's performance, Evans et al. (2014) .
RESULTS

BRL Estimates
Limitations
Th is study encounters four signifi cant limitations. First, while change in top management is likely to be the result of involuntary turnover, some managers do leave voluntarily due to better job opportunities. At this point, it is not possible to identify the factors that caused change in top management structures. Secondly, this research does not take into account the dynamics of management change. Th irdly, it utilized publicly available data from the annual reports. Despite the fact that large and medium-sized companies in Serbia are subject to external fi nancial audits, fi nancial statements are burdened with hidden losses that could infl uence the accuracy of ratios used in the research. However, no appropriate substitute for this data could be found. Moreover, due to relatively small number of observations within the categories, the estimated signifi cance of the variables used in the model does not allow a researcher to defi ne a statistically defensible model. Despite the aforementioned limitations, the results off er valuable insights for future research.
CONCLUSIONS
Th e paper provides evidence on the extent to which fi nancial distress aff ects the top management structures. It shows that in the majority of the companies in the Republic of Serbia, fi nancial distress exerts statistically signifi cant impact on the top management structures. In 21 companies that completed bankruptcy via adoption of the reorganization plan, top management structures changed aft er the fi ling year, or within two years following the adoption of the reorganization plan. Th is indicates that fi nancial distress and reorganization may play a signifi cant role in providing discipline to the corporate governance system as a whole. We believe that future research should be more focused on examining whether changes in top management structures aff ect the long-term performance of the reorganized companies. Despite the fact that the existing statistics are not encouraging, they could be improved by larger involvement of creditors in management of the reorganized companies. In this way, they will be more willing to provide the company in fi nancial distress with additional fi nancial resources.
Th e question that imposes itself is whether socio-demographic characteristics and diff erences in legal regimes aff ect change in corporate control in the companies in fi nancial distress. As regards this, international comparison could improve the existing knowledge and corporate governance practices in the companies in fi nancial distress. 
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